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By James A. Russell 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed 
here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the 
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters during a visit to Bangkok: “We want 
Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the United States extends a defense 
umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in the Gulf, 
it's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer because they won't be able to intimidate and 
dominate as they apparently believe they can once they have a nuclear weapon.” 
Some seized upon these comments as an indication that the United States would be prepared to 
explicitly commit its strategic nuclear deterrent to the defense of the region. The strategic nuclear 
deterrent would fit together in a seamless web of conventional and nuclear weapons as part of a 
U.S.-backed system of regional security to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran from creating a coercive 
political framework to intimidate its smaller gulf neighbors. Not all America’s regional allies found 
her comments useful. Israeli officials immediately criticized Secretary Clinton’s statement as 
evidence that the United States would accept the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. Reaction in 
Arab capitals was more muted, although Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated that Egypt 
would not participate in such an umbrella and would not allow foreign troops on its soil.[1] 
Secretary Clinton’s formulation contains a number of interesting elements and usefully raises 
many questions about U.S. regional strategy and policy. A core issue is simply this: what roles do 
the estimated 2,200 operational nuclear warheads that constitute the nation’s strategic nuclear 
deterrent play in America’s security strategy in the Gulf? 
Clinton’s remarks come as the Obama Administration is drafting the congressionally-mandated 
2009-2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Due out in February 2010, the report is expected to describe 
the Administration’s plans for the size and configuration of the nuclear arsenal and the role of 
these weapons in national security strategy. President Obama reportedly ordered drafters of the 
report at the Pentagon to go back to the drawing board to embrace further deep cuts in the 
nuclear arsenal consistent with his Administration’s commitment to an aggressive disarmament 
agenda.[2] 
The paper will address the challenges facing policy-makers in the Gulf region as they seek to 
square the Obama Administration’s policy goals of nuclear disarmament with a variety of regional 
security commitments that, as indicated by Secretary Clinton, may implicitly draw upon the 
nuclear arsenal. This paper will explore the issues that the NPR drafters should be considering as 
they think through the role of the strategic arsenal as tool to secure the nation’s strategic 
objectives in the volatile Gulf and Middle East regions. 
Past as Prologue? 
How useful is the Cold War past in suggesting lessons for today’s strategic planners in thinking 
through the role of nuclear weapons in regional strategy? The strategic deterrent has made 
episodic appearances as a tool of American foreign policy in the Middle East and the Gulf. 
Throughout most of the Cold War, nuclear weapons were seen as the ultimate guarantor of the 
broader military mission to “defend the region” against encroachment from outside powers like 
the Soviet Union. Planning for the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East began in earnest in 
the early 1950s as military strategists sought ways to redress Soviet conventional military 
superiority around the world. 
In June 1950, the National Security Council issued a report (NSC 26/3) titled Demolition and 
Abandonment of Oil Facilities and Fields in the Middle East. The report addressed the possibility 
of plugging Saudi oil wells “as a means of conservation and denial during enemy occupation.” 
Nuclear weapons were looked at as a possible tool to deny the Soviets access to the oil fields. 
The report found, “Denial of wells by radiological means can be accomplished to prevent an 
enemy from utilizing the oil, but it could not prevent him from forcing ‘expendable’ Arabs to enter 
the contaminated areas to open well heads and deplete the reservoirs. Therefore, aside from 
other ill effects on the Arab population, it is not considered that radiological means are practicable 
as a conservation measure.”[3] Such was the initial (and unsuccessful) attempt to find a useful 
role for nuclear weapons in regional strategy. 
In October 1973, U.S. forces—including the Strategic Air Command—were placed on heightened 
alert in response to possible Soviet military intervention to keep the Israelis from destroying the 
surrounded Egyptian Third Army. During the crisis, Henry Kissinger sent Soviet leader Brezhnev 
a message stating that the introduction of Soviet troops into the region would represent a violation 
of the recently signed Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War. The implication of Kissinger’s message 
was obvious: introduction of Soviet troops could have led to a nuclear face-off between the Cold 
War antagonists. 
In January 1980, following the takeover of the American embassy in Iran and in response to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter stated, “An attempt by an outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force.” At the time, Carter’s statement was widely considered to encompass the 
use of nuclear weapons in response to a potential Soviet advance onto the Gulf. In February 
1980, details of a Pentagon report emerged indicating that the United States might have to use 
tactical nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet move towards the Gulf.[4] The Pentagon study, 
Capabilities in the Persian Gulf, helped form the basis for recommendations to create the Rapid 
Joint Deployment Task Force, which later became the U.S. Central Command. 
In the spring of 1996, the application of the strategic deterrent in the region occurred in the 
context of counterproliferation policy. The United States detected construction of an underground 
site at Tarhuna in Libya that was widely believed to be related to Libya’s production of chemical-
warfare agents. Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that the United States would consider 
a wide range of options to ensure that Tarhuna did not become operational. In discussing the 
Libyan site, Perry stated that any country attacking the United States with chemical weapons 
would “have to fear the consequences of a response from any weapon in our inventory.” He 
further elaborated that “we could make a devastating response without the use of nuclear 
weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility.”[5] 
Potential use of nuclear weapons emerged in wars with Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003. 
Statements made by a variety of senior government officials in both crises reflected a belief by 
decision makers that the nuclear arsenal had a role in deterring the potential use of chemical or 
biological weapons against U.S. forces. 
In the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration assigned a variety of roles to 
nuclear weapons in the region. [6] The 2003 NPR noted that nuclear weapons could both 
reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security and could dissuade potential adversaries 
from competing against American pre-eminence. The document strongly implied that the strategic 
deterrent was committed to the defense of Israel. It specifically suggested that nuclear weapons 
might be needed to target hardened and deeply buried targets in the region. The 2009-2010 NPR 
will have to address some of these same issues. 
Conceptual and Strategic Clarity? 
The NPR drafters face a tall order insofar as their deliberations involve the application of the 
strategic deterrent in the Gulf. Despite the fact that the region is home to over 150,000 troops 
housed in an extensive and widely dispersed basing infrastructure, there has been little strategic 
thinking about U.S. regional strategy and policy since the decision to defend the Arabian 
Peninsula and evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1990. After the war, the United States 
essentially settled upon a comfortable “holding action” administered by its Navy and Air Force 
under the rubric of enforcing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions—an approach 
that continued the strategic drift in U.S. strategy and policy. To the extent that the approach of the 
1990s era of “dual containment’ can be considered a strategy—it’s clear that the approach failed 
on at least one count: Iranian influence is perceived to be on the rise, courtesy of the removal of 
its major regional adversary, Saddam Hussein, courtesy of the United States military. 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq initially justified as a preventative war based on counter-proliferation 
objectives came not a result of strategic clarity but from the strategic drift and obtuseness of the 
1990s that then became coupled with the ill-defined concept of the “war on terror.” While useful 
for domestic political purposes the term served no strategic use and created conceptual 
confusion from which U.S. security strategy still suffers. Symptomatic of the strategic fog is the 
disinterest in exploring the “real” reasons for the Iraq invasion and determining whether the 
invasion today could be at all related to national strategic objectives. 
Today, American regional strategy seems shaped more by the inexorable forces of organizational 
and bureaucratic momentum than by enunciated strategic requirements by the national command 
authority. The U.S. forward deployed military has built out a vast physical basing infrastructure in 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. For example, the 5th Fleet Headquarters 
in Manama, Bahrain, occupies 62 acres that is home to 54 tenant commands. In the last five 
years, the Air Force has poured over $60 million in military construction into Al Dhafra Air Base in 
the United Arab Emirates that is now home to 1000-odd military personnel that work at the base’s 
Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Launch and Recovery Facility and 
Maintenance Complex. Another $75 million in military construction funding has been used to 
construct an “aerial port” at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. Hundreds of millions in military 
construction projects has created many large bases in Iraq. These are but a few examples of the 
way in which U.S. Gulf strategy is being “built” by Army Corps of Engineers projects instead of 
policy pronouncements from civilian and military leaders. 
Since President Carter’s pronouncement, no subsequent administration has articulated an 
enduring formulation of American strategic interests in the region and the role that force, including 
nuclear weapons, would play in securing those objectives.[7] Directly relating nuclear weapons—
whatever their number -- to strategic objectives will thus require a clear enunciation of those 
strategic objectives—objectives that remain unclear in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion of 
Iraq. 
Does the United States still seek to defend the region? If so, from whom? Does it see its military 
presence as a tool to preserve regional stability and manage the regional balance of power? If so, 
what should a stable balance look like and what role should its conventional and nuclear forces 
play in maintaining that balance? Does it see the forward deployed force as an instrument to help 
create democracy and civil societies? What is the role of conventional and nuclear forces as an 
instrument of nonproliferation policy? Is the forward deployed presence intended primarily to 
preserve stable pricing in world energy markets? All these unanswered questions only deepen 
the intellectual fog surrounding American strategic objectives in the Gulf.[8] 
Extended Deterrence and Security Assurances in the Gulf 
Secretary Clinton’s pronouncement interestingly addresses some of these issues—despite the 
lack of an overarching strategic and policy framework. It in some senses her remarks provide a 
useful starting point for strategic planners working on the NPR to consider the role that nuclear 
weapons could and even should take as a tool in furthering American regional interests. In the 
Gulf, the United States maintains a complex and intersecting web of conventional and nuclear 
guarantees meant to reassure allies of American commitment to their security and to deter 
adversaries from threatening those allies.[9] Not all the recipients of these guarantees are on 
friendly terms. For example, the United States maintains close security relationships with regional 
antagonists in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which operate under 
U.S. protection, have no diplomatic relations with Israel, which is also the recipient of American 
security guarantees. 
In Israel’s case, it has been the object of repeated and specific assurances of American 
commitment up to and including nuclear weapons if necessary. In extending a nuclear umbrella 
over Israel,[10] senior American officials have repeatedly made veiled references of their 
commitment to use all means at their disposal to defend Israel up to and including nuclear 
weapons. Vice President Dick Cheney offered the following representative formulation of the 
American commitment to Israeli security in 2008 when he stated: “America’s commitment to 
Israel’s security is enduring and unshakable . . .as is our commitment to Israel’s right to defend 
itself always against terrorism, rocket attacks and other threats from forces dedicated to Israel’s 
destruction.”[11] Then-President Bush specifically stated in February 2006 that the United States 
would defend Israel militarily in the event of an attack by Iran.[12] In October 2007, President 
Bush went so far as to state that a nuclear-armed Iran might lead to World War III.[13] In remarks 
that received no disavowals from government sources, then-Democratic presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton stated in April 2008 that the United States would “obliterate” Iran if it ever attacked 
Israel with nuclear weapons.[14] 
Clinton’s remarks in Bangkok reflect an implicit belief that this intersecting web of deterrent 
objectives and security commitments serve the dual purpose of (1) warning an adversary against 
any expectations that acquisition of nuclear weapons will lead to regional political dominance; and 
(2) reassuring regional allies that acquisition of nuclear weapons by the adversary will not subject 
them to coercive influence from the adversary as a result of American political and military 
commitment to their security. In this particular case, the statement is intended to signal Iran that 
no tangible benefit will obtain from nuclear weapons while simultaneously seeking to deter its 
allies from taking corresponding steps should Iran achieve nuclear weapons status. These 
assurances are thus regarded as a vital non-proliferation tool as the United States seeks to 
prevent a regional arms race in response to Iran’s apparent pursuit of a nuclear capability. 
Her formulation reflects a firm historic grounding in the time-honored Cold War concepts of 
extended deterrence and security assurances, both of which have served as vitally important 
tools of American statecraft since the dawn of the nuclear age.[15] Extended deterrence is the 
threat to use force, including nuclear weapons, against an adversary that threatens an ally. As 
noted by political scientist Paul Huth: “The objective of extended deterrence is to protect other 
countries and territories from attack, as opposed to preventing a direct attack on one’s own 
national territory.”[16] Security assurances are the means through which the actor drawing upon 
extended deterrence conveys the commitment to an ally’s security. Each of these concepts is 
critically contingent on the credibility of the actor extending the deterrent umbrella and the 
security guarantees, which may or may not involve the specific commitment of nuclear 
weapons.[17] To be effective, the actor receiving these assurances and the antagonist 
threatening action must be convinced that the security provider is prepared to follow through on 
its conveyed commitments.[18] 
The linked concepts of extended deterrence and security guarantees are nothing new to 
American security strategy.[19] During the Cold War, the United States’ commitment to defend 
Europe became operationalized through a series of extended deterrent commitments that 
included the basing of nuclear weapons in Europe that could have been used in the event of a 
Soviet attack. In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies eventually constructed a 
“seamless” web of conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat a 
Soviet invasion.[20] 
More recently, United States clearly still believes that the concept has great relevance in 
Northeast Asia. In response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests during the last several 
years, senior U.S. officials quickly and routinely fan out to South Korea and Japan to “assure” 
them of America’s commitment to their security.[21] A main target of these efforts is to forestall 
the possibility that either South Korea or Japan will reconsider decisions not to develop nuclear 
weapons. Japan in particular has a robust nuclear infrastructure and is now widely considered to 
be a “latent” nuclear power that could develop a weapon reasonably quickly. 
As is the case in Northeast Asia, the United States today routinely acts as if extended deterrence 
and security assurances together constitute active, ongoing and useful tools in managing its 
regional security relationships in the Gulf. Secretary Clinton’s recent remarks only represent the 
latest evidence that this is the case. In May 2006, for example, the Bush Administration embarked 
on a much ballyhooed “Gulf Security Dialogue” that sought to re-invigorate U.S. security 
relationships with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The initiative was presented 
as part of a consultative process to focus attention on building regional self defense capabilities; 
consulting on regional security issues like the Iran nuclear program and fallout of Iran’s struggle 
against Sunni extremists; the U.S. invasion of Iraq; counter-proliferation; counter-terrorism and 
internal security; and critical infrastructure protection.[22] The dialogue came as the Bush 
Administration proposed billions of dollars in new arms sales to Israel and its Gulf partners that 
included precision guided munitions such as the Joint Defense Attack Munition and the Advanced 
Medium Range Air to Air Missile. 
The Gulf Security dialogue is but the latest chapter of an active and ongoing practice of 
reassurance that dates to the early 1990s, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, to 1945 and the 
assurances made by President Roosevelt to the Saudi leader, King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. The 
United States has worked assiduously to operationalize conventionally-oriented extended 
deterrence commitments and security guarantees in the Gulf. As noted by Kathleen McKiness: 
“Extended deterrence is not a hands-off strategy. It cannot be created from a distance through a 
submarine capability in the Persian Gulf or a troop deployment in another country such as Iraq. It 
is a real, tangible, physical commitment, to be palpably felt both by allies and adversaries.”[23] 
The United States has indeed worked hard at this in the Gulf largely through its ever-efficient 
military bureaucracies. 
In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the United States actively sought and concluded a 
series of bilateral security agreements with each of the Gulf States that became operationlized 
under something called defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs. These commitments between 
the United States and the regional signatories contained a number of critical elements: (1) that 
the United States and the host nation should jointly respond to external threats when each party 
deemed necessary; (2) permitted access to host nation military facilities by U.S. military 
personnel; (3) permitted the pre-positioning of U.S. military equipment in the host nation as 
agreed by the parties; (4) and status of forces provisions which addressed the legal status of 
deployed U.S. military personnel. The United States today has agreements with all the Gulf 
States except Saudi Arabia, which is subject to similar bilateral security commitments conveyed 
in a variety of different forums. Under these agreements, the United States and the host nation 
annually convene meetings to review regional threats and developments in their security 
partnerships. One of the principal purposes of these meetings is for both sides to reassure the 
other side of their continued commitment to the security relationship. In short, this process 
operationalizes the conveyance of security guarantees in ways that reflect the principles in the 
DCAs. 
Using this Cold War-era template, the United States built an integrated system of regional 
security in the 1990s that saw it: (1) preposition three brigades worth of military equipment in the 
Gulf in Qatar, Kuwait and afloat with the Maritime Pre-positioning ships program; (2) build host 
nation military capabilities through exercises, training and arms sales; and, (3) build out a 
physical basing infrastructure that continues its expansion today. Each of the Central Command’s 
major service components today have forward headquarters in the region today spread between 
Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Udied Air Base in Qatar and the 5th Fleet Naval Headquarters in Manama. 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States further added to this infrastructure with bases 
in Iraq and a space at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates used by the Air Force for 
ISR missions. 
As is the case in Northeast Asia, there is a substantial basing infrastructure with significant 
numbers of forward deployed U.S. military personnel. The major difference in Northeast Asia is 
that a hostile actor (North Korea) has already achieved a nuclear capability while in the Gulf, Iran 
may aspire to achieve North Korea’s nuclear status. In Northeast Asia, the nuclear component of 
U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees is palpable, whereas in the Gulf it is more 
implicit, or existential. 
Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence 
The build out of the U.S. military infrastructure points around the region provide the hosting states 
with tangible evidence of the credibility of the American military commitment to their security. The 
military footprint today in the Gulf is no “trip-wire” force, but is engaged in tangible military 
operations, such as the multi-national maritime security operations conducted in the Gulf and the 
Arabian Sea by the combined task force command operating out of the 5th Fleet Headquarters in 
Manama. 
Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, the United States has repeatedly 
demonstrated its willingness to deploy its conventional forces to the region in response to 
regional instability. Starting with Operation Earnest Will in 1988, the United States slowly but 
inexorably inserted itself into the role played by the British for over a century as protecting the 
Gulf States from external threats. Following Operation Desert Storm, the United States kept 
sufficient forces in theater to enforce the United Nations’ cease fire resolutions on a recalcitrant 
Saddam. Last, but not least, it flowed significant forces and absorbed the monetary costs of 
toppling Saddam and providing a protective conventional force that can be readily called upon by 
the Iraq regime if needed. Given this history it is difficult to see how any state could doubt the 
credibility of the United States’ commitments to use its conventional forces as an instrument of 
regional defense. 
This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in 
operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the 
Gulf—unlike Northeast Asia—the role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out 
and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons 
might remain unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces 
whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary. The entire (and substantial) 
American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrella—headlines or 
no headlines. If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over America’s forward deployed Gulf 
presence, it’s hard not to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are 
hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clinton’s recent statements is that she 
seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed 
by nuclear weapons in the region. 
While the United States has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as negative security assurances), it maintains a 
policy of calculated ambiguity in honoring those commitments if its forces are attacked by 
chemical or biological weapons.[24] President Clinton reinforced this position in Presidential 
Decision Memorandum 60 in December 1997, which stated: 
The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon 
state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an 
invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, 
its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by 
such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.[25] 
As previously noted, the United States last unsheathed this proverbial sword in 1996 with the 
discovery of a potential chemical weapons plant in Libya. The sword, however, remains at the 
ready in the Gulf where Iran’s development of chemical weapons, long-range missiles, and its 
emphasis on terrorism and asymmetric warfare constitute prominent elements of the regional 
threat environment. If anything Iran’s weakened conventional forces potentially drive Iranian 
military responses during an armed conflict to those weapons that would lead the United States to 
consider forswearing its negative security assurances.[26] In this scenario, it seems clear that 
American nuclear weapons are a component in the web of military capabilities designed to 
discourage Iranian use of its unconventional weapons in war. 
Conclusion 
Nuclear weapons have historically helped implicitly and explicitly support America’s far flung 
global commitments in the Gulf and elsewhere. The system of Gulf security built by the United 
States reflects a time-honored template of regional defense and security honed in decades of 
Cold War experience. In the Gulf, the dual tools of extended deterrence and security assurances 
have proven a cornerstone of a system of regional security efficiently administered by America’s 
military organizations. Nuclear weapons today undeniably form part of this system—explicitly 
protecting U.S. forces and implicitly protecting regimes hosting those forces. 
It remains to be seen how today NPR drafters will addresses the historic context of these 
commitments in the Gulf and the role of nuclear weapons in helping maintain a Cold War-era 
template of regional security. Actively promoting nuclear disarmament on the one hand while also 
drawing upon nuclear weapons on the other to prevent a regional nuclear arms race in the Gulf is 
a contradiction that must be addressed by the NPR drafters. They must therefore try and square 
a series of circles of competing and contradictory requirements in relating nuclear weapons to 
global and regional strategic priorities. 
The Obama Administration’s aggressive disarmament agenda is sure to emphasize continued 
cuts in the strategic arsenal and will almost certainly include an attempt to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A reduced number of warheads will need to be apportioned to 
national-level protection and extended deterrent commitments in Northeast Asia and the Gulf 
region. The possible signing of the CTBT will represent another nail in the coffin of what may 
become a “wasting asset” of strategic nuclear weapons in the American arsenal.[27] That 
stockpile is slowly withering away as aging weapons deteriorate and the human and material 
infrastructure around those weapons becomes more difficult and expensive to maintain.[28] 
In short, the United States is slowly but surely disarming itself—a scenario that must be 
addressed in NPR. This trend will mean that the United States will one day be unable to draw 
upon any nuclear weapons to back extended guarantee commitments in the Gulf and elsewhere 
around the world. This inevitability will lead planners down some of the same paths of the 2002 
report, which spent proposed using conventional weapons for missions once assigned to nuclear 
weapons. In the Middle East, the problem of targeting hardened and deeply buried targets will 
rear its head in 2010 as it did in 2002. 
In the Gulf, nuclear planners must determine the role played by nuclear weapons in the region. 
This in turn means drawing upon a set of clearly articulated regional objectives that have so far 
not been forthcoming. If policy-makers determine that extended deterrence and security 
guarantees are to remain as vital tools of strategy and policy (as implied by Secretary Clinton), 
the NPR will have to sort out the numbers and types of weapons that may be needed to fill these 
commitments while also satisfying the Obama Administration’s goal of nuclear disarmament. 
Nuclear disarmament and extended deterrent commitments are not compatible, whatever the 
expanded roles for conventional munitions. 
Last but not least, the United States today faces the prospect of extending deterrence and 
security assurances in a regional political environment in which the governing elites must pay 
increasing attention to publics which do not necessarily share their leaders’ enthusiasm for 
American protection.[29] This is an issue that cannot be managed by the NPR drafters, but it is 
nevertheless an uncertainty that may reduce the utility of extended deterrence in the Gulf before 
the erosion of the nuclear stockpile. 
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